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Fiscal decentralization, the allocation of tax and spending powers to lower levels of govern-
ment, is now an established policy objective, in many developed and developing countries.
For example, nearly all the large Latin American countries have initiated some form of
ﬁscal decentralization in the last decade e.g. Bolivia (Faguet(2004)), as have Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Pakistan, to name just a few. China and Russia’s transition from
socialism involves various aspects of decentralization. Moreover, it is actively promoted
as a development strategy by organizations such as the World Bank1. There have also
been similar reforms in high-income countries, e.g. devolution of tax and spending powers
to Scotland in the UK in 1999, and in Italy, starting in 1993 with the introduction of a
municipal property tax.
The usual advantages that are claimed for decentralization, that one can ﬁnd in the
literature, include the following.2 First, decentralization is claimed to improve allocative
eﬃciency, in the sense that the goods provided by governments in localities will be better
matched to the preferences of the residents of those localities. This is sometimes known as
the preference-matching argument. There is now a large theoretical literature evaluating
the preference-matching argument, and some more recent empirical papers3.
Second, decentralization is argued to increase the accountability of government. In
the literature, this term is used in rather a broad sense, and refers to constraints on the
rent-seeking activities of oﬃce holders, such as diverting rents from the public purse, tak-
ing bribes, favouring of particular interest groups, and insuﬃcient innovation and eﬀort.
Interestingly, in this case, the lead has been taken by empirical researchers: there are
now a number of cross-sectional and panel studies that show that across countries, mea-
sures of ﬁscal decentralization are generally negatively correlated with low accountability
outcomes, such as corruption and poor governance,4 although there are some dissenting
1For more details on country decentralization programs, and the World Bank’s view of the costs and
beneﬁts, see http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/, or World Bank (2000).
2For recent reviews of the advantages of decentralization, see Azfar et (2001), Oates (1999) and
McKinnon and Nechyba (1997).
3Theoretical work includes Alesina and Spolare(1997), Besley and Coate(2003), Bolton and
Roland(1997) and Cremer and Palfrey(1996), Ellingsen(1998), Gilbert and Picard(1996), Lock-
wood(2002), Oates(1972), Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf(2002). Empirical work includes Azfar et
al.(2001), Faguet(2004), Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf(2002).
4See among others Huther and Shah(1998), Fissman and Gatti(2002), Mello and Barenstein(2001).
More recently, Fissman and Gatti(2002a) and Henderson and Kuncoro(2004) have shown, using sub-
national data for the US and Indonesia respectively, that expenditure decentralization is only eﬀective
in reducing corruption if it is accompanied by increased powers to raise revenue : ”unfunded mandates”
2views (Treisman (2000),(2002)).
However, accountability is notoriously diﬃcult to pin down precisely, and perhaps
reﬂecting this, there have been rather few attempts to analyze theoretically how the degree
of accountability varies with ﬁscal (de)-centralization. Broadly speaking, accountability
of elected representatives may be problematic either when those representatives have
diﬀerent preferences over policy to the electorate (a political agency problem), or when the
representatives have no policy preferences but are subject to lobbying by interest groups.
In this paper, we are concerned with the political agency aspect of accountability5.
Here, there are two main ways in which ﬁscal decentralization may aid accountability.
The ﬁrst mechanism, investigated by Besley and Smart(2003) and Hindriks and Belle-
ﬂamme(2005) is via yardstick competition: if there is some statistical correlation in the
environments of neighboring incumbents (e.g. correlation in the cost of producing a lo-
cal public good), voters can learn something about the type of their own incumbent by
observing the policy choices of incumbents in other jurisdictions.
The second, investigated by Seabright(1996), and Persson and Tabellini(2000) in
Chapter 9 of their book, is that decentralization strengthens the link between policy
choices and re-election chances, which we will call the pivot probability eﬀect. In his im-
portant contribution, Seabright(1996) studied a two-period model of the political process
where there is an agency problem between politicians and voters due to moral hazard.
In each period, the incumbent chooses rent diversion r, which gives rise to public good
provision g = τ − r + θ where τ is ﬁxed tax revenue and θ a productivity shock that is
observed by neither incumbent or voters. As is standard in this kind of model (see e.g.
the classic paper of Ferejohn(1986)), the voters set a performance standard ˆ g,b yv o t i n g
t h ei n c u m b e n to u to fo ﬃce if his production of the public good is lower than ˆ g.T h i sg i v e s
him an incentive to restrain rent-diversion in the ﬁrst period.
Now suppose that the economy is composed of n regions, and with decentralization,
there is one policy-maker in each region, and with centralization, a single policy-maker.
Suppose also initially that the productivity shocks θ are region-speciﬁc, rather than spe-
ciﬁc to the policy-maker i.e. all policy-makers are identical. Then, moving from decentral-
ization to centralization, there are two ways in which the incentive for the policy-maker
to restrain rent-diversion changes. First, and most obviously, with centralization, if the
policy-maker wins the election, he can expect more rent in the second period (in fact, he
lead local oﬃcials to ﬁnd other sources of revenue.
5On the lobbying aspect, see Bardhan and Mookherjee(2000), which measures accountability (neg-
atively) as the degree to which government policy is distorted by the presence of a lobby group and
Bordignon, Colombo, and Galmarini (2003).
3extracts maximum rent in all regions, rather than one, so in the absence of any exogenous
ego-rent from oﬃce (Persson-Tabellini(2000)), his future rent just rises by a factor of n).
This rent scale eﬀect suggests that centralization will lead the incumbent to take less
rent in the ﬁrst period. But there is a second, more subtle eﬀect of centralization, loss of
accountability through the reduction in the probability that the voters in any one region
are pivotal in determining the outcome of the election (the reduced pivot probability eﬀect6
of centralization). This reduced pivot probability eﬀect encourages the incumbent to take
more rents with centralization.
A weakness of Seabright’s model is that there are a continuum of equilibria: all policy-
makers are identical, and so whatever their performance in oﬃce, voters are ex post
indiﬀerent about voting them out of oﬃce or retaining them at the end of the ﬁrst period.
Persson and Tabellini(2000, Chapter 9.1) resolve this indeterminacy by supposing that
the productivity shock θ is an inherent competence characteristic of the incumbent. Then,
voters are not indiﬀerent about a performance cutoﬀ ex post, because the higher ˆ g, the
more likely it is that the incumbent who passes it is competent7. But, they retain
Seabright’s assumption that the ﬁrst-period incumbent does not observe his competence
level.
So, in the terminology of Besley and Smart(2003), the work of Seabright(1996) and
Persson and Tabellini(2000) only focuses on the incentive eﬀects of elections, not the
selection eﬀects8. In more detail, recall that elections provide accountability in two
senses. First, they allow voters to de-select bad incumbents (selection eﬀects). Sec-
ond, the selection eﬀect provides an incentive for incumbents to change their behavior
6To illustrate, consider the case of three regions, and suppose that the voter can choose high rent
diversion, in which case he wins with probability 0, or low rent diversion, in which case he wins with
probability p. With decentralization, the incumbent can raise his probability of winning by p by cutting
rent diversion. With centralization, suppose the incumbent raises his rent-diversion in region i, assuming
it is already low in the other two regions. Region i is only pivotal if the incumbent wins in one of
the other regions and loses in the other, an event which occurs with probability 2p(1 − p˙ ). So, with
centralization, the incumbent can raise his probability of winning by q = p× 2p(1 − p˙ ) by cutting rent
diversion. Obviously, q<p ,so the reduced pivot probability eﬀect reduces the incentive to limit rents.
7An equilibrium of this model is thus described as (i) a level of ﬁrst-period rent diversion by the
incumbent, ˆ r, and (ii) a cutoﬀ ˆ g such that given ˆ r, his competence is judged to be at least as great as
the challenger. Persson and Tabellini show how the rent scale eﬀect and the pivot eﬀect work in the
determination of ˆ r.
8it is remarkable that the complete contracting principal-agent theory also ignores the selection eﬀect
to consider only incentives. One notable exception is Banks and Sundaram (1998) who study the optimal
retention rule in agency problems, and show that in equilibrium the chosen retention rule disciplines the
agents (incentive eﬀect) and the retained agents are more productive on average (selection eﬀect).
4in order to increase the probability of re-election (incentive or discipline eﬀects) In
Seabright, there are no selection eﬀects, as all policy-makers are identical. In Persson
and Tabellini(2000), because the incumbent does not know his own competence when he
sets ﬁrst-period policy, the probability that an incumbent of given competence wins the
election is the same with centralization and decentralization. Speciﬁcally, as both the
incumbent’s and challenger’s competence levels are random draws from the same distribu-
tion, the probability that the initial incumbent has a competence level above the expected
level of the challenger is simply 0.5. So, with both centralization and decentralization, by
construction, the incumbent loses oﬃce with probability 0.5.
This paper addresses the key question of what eﬀect ﬁscal (de)-centralization will have
on both incentive and selection eﬀects of elections. For selection eﬀe c t st ob et r u l ye n d o g e -
nous (and thus vary between centralization and decentralization), there must be asym-
metric information: the incumbent must be better-informed about his own competence
(or some other characteristic) than the electorate. This paper provides a comprehensive
analysis of such a model. Our main objective in doing this is to see how accountabil-
ity (as measured by the pivot probability eﬀect in Seabright’s moral hazard model) can
be formalized in this setting. It turns out that accountability and voter welfare under
centralization depend crucially on the amount of information available to a voter in any
jurisdiction i about ﬁscal policy in other jurisdictions, and comparison of possible infor-
mation structures is also a major theme of this paper.
O u rm o d e lh a st w op e r i o d sa n dn regions. In the ﬁr s tp e r i o d ,t h et y p eo ft h ei n c u m b e n t
policy-maker is determined by random draw: the incumbent may be ”good” or ”bad”.
With decentralization, the policy-maker in region i, knowing his type, then chooses a tax
and a level of public good provision in their region. Voters observe this choice and then
vote for the incumbent or the challenger. The type of the challenger is also determined by
random draw. In the second period, the winner again chooses a tax and a level of public
good provision in their region. The (probability of) separation here is clearly endogenous
because the bad incumbent may choose to pool with (imitate) the good incumbent, or
separate (reveal his type by acting opportunistically). With centralization, the only dif-
f e r e n c ei st h a ti ne a c hp e r i o d ,t h e r ei so n l yo n ep o l i c y - m a k e rw h oc h o o s e sﬁscal policy
in all regions, subject to a common budget constraint. We do not impose (initially) the
requirement that the tax be uniform across regions.
Our results are robust to several ways of specifying ”good” and ”bad” types. For
purposes of exposition, we work mainly with the speciﬁcation of Besley and Smart(2003),
where the good type is benevolent i.e. maximizes the welfare of all the voters in his region,
5and the bad type maximizes rents diverted from tax revenue.9 But, in Section 7, we show
that all the qualitative results carry over to a variant of the model based on Persson and
Tabellini(2000) where policy-makers all maximize rents, but diﬀer in their competence
i.e. ability to supply the public good from a given amount of tax revenue.10
Our main results are as follows. First, we focus on two key features of the equilibrium
when comparing centralization and decentralization, separation probabilities,a n dexpected
voter welfare. The separation probability is the ex ante probability that a bad incumbent
decides to separate in equilibrium, which he will do by diverting rent without restraint in
a l lt h ej u r i s d i c t i o n sh ei sr e s p o n s i b l ef o r .
We begin by studying a benchmark (but not particularly realistic) case where voters
have ”full information” i.e. can observe taxes set, and public goods supplied in all regions,
not just their own. In this case, we show that these separation probabilities may be higher
or lower with centralization than with decentralization.11 Also, comparing voter welfare
between centralization and decentralization, all that matters is the separation probability.
That is, if voters have a preference for more (less) separation, then the ﬁscal arrangement
that gives a higher (lower) separation probability will be preferred ex ante by all voters.
Voters have a preference for more (less) separation when the discount factor and the
expected quality of the politicians are above (below) a critical value. So an increase
in the chance of re-electing the incumbent is not necessarily bad for the voters. This is
in contrast to some recent work that seems to worry about the rise in the incumbent
advantage.
We then turn to the case where voters have ”partial information” (i.e. they can ob-
serve the tax set, and public good supplied, only in their own region). In this case, the
analog of Seabright’s pivot probability eﬀect arises, which we call selective rent diversion.
Speciﬁcally, with centralization, if the incumbent wishes to win the election and stay in
oﬃce, he can do so most eﬃciently by only imitating the good incumbent in a minimum
majority of m =( n +1 ) /2 regions, and can take unconstrained rent in the other regions.
In this sense, he is less accountable to the electorate with centralization than with decen-
9This has two attractions ﬁrst, the results work out relatively neatly. Second, in this model, the choice
of tax is endogenous, whereas in the competence model, it is basically ﬁxed.
10In this model, competence matters to voters because the policy-maker cannot divert all tax revenue
as rent: the remainder then provides a public good, with the more competent type providing more of the
public good.
11Note that, in contrast to Baron and Besanko (1992), the opportunity of information consolidation
with centralization does not necessarily improves voter information about the quality of the incumbent;
this is because the incumbent chooses how much information to reveal in equilibrium by pooling or not.
6tralization. Selective rent diversion has two implications. First, it tends to decrease the
separation probability relative to decentralization, and second, it unambiguously decreases
voter welfare with centralization, for a given separation probability.
It does not follow from this, however, that voter welfare is always lower with central-
ization and partial information than it is with either centralization and full information,
or decentralization. This is because the separation probability is endogenous: using this
fact, counterexamples can be found to both of those statements. So, in particular, with
centralization, it is not generally true that giving voters more information will make
them better oﬀ. This result is comparable to Proposition 5 of Besley and Smart(2003),
who demonstrate that yardstick competition between regions (which can only occur when
voters are fully informed in our sense) does not necessarily increase voter welfare. The
m e c h a n i s ma tw o r ki sq u i t ed i ﬀerent, however: in our case, statistical correlation in the
cost of producing the public good in each region is not needed.
Then, we study the empirically important case of uniform taxation when decision-
making is centralized. This is intermediate between partial and full information, as voters
only observe public good provision in their own region, but eﬀectively observe all the
information they need about the spending in all regions (although they cannot distinguish
whether spending in other regions is on public goods or is diverted as rents). In this case,
the results are qualitatively similar to the case of partial information. In particular,
accountability of the incumbent is limited because he can selectively pool. But, if he
chooses to selectively pool, his ability to extract rents in the minority of regions where
he does not pool is lower than with partial information: because the same tax is set
and observed by the voters in all regions, he cannot set the maximum tax, but only the
highest tax that a good incumbent might possibly set. An implication is that if voters
have a constitutional choice ex ante between diﬀerentiated and uniform taxes under a
wide range of conditions, they will choose uniform taxation (unless they can observe ﬁscal
policy ex post in other regions). Thus, our model provides a novel explanation for the
widely observed ”stylized fact” that centrally set taxes are almost always uniform. The
argument is that uniform taxation is a useful device to transmit information to voters
about spending levels in other regions.
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model.
Section 3 studies the case of decentralization for the benevolence model. Sections 4, 5, and
6 study the cases of centralization with full voter information, partial voter information,
and uniform taxation respectively for the benevolence model. Section 7 makes the case
that most of the key results are robust as they also hold for the competence model .
Section 8 discusses other extensions. Section 9 concludes.
72. The Model
2.1. Preliminaries
T h e r ea r et w ot i m ep e r i o d st =1 ,2 a n da no d dn u m b e ro fr e g i o n si =1 ,..n, with n ≥ 3. In
each region in each time period, an incumbent politician makes decisions about taxation
and public good provision. Moreover, at the end of period 1, there is an election in which
voters choose between the incumbent and a challenger, having observed only ﬁrst-period
ﬁscal policy. With decentralization, there are n incumbents and n challengers: one in each
region. With centralization, there is one incumbent and challenger.




t from a regional public good gi
t and a private good xi
t in period t.
All agents have an endowment of the private good, normalized to unity. The public good
is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax τi
t, so that utility of the typical voter is H(gi
t)+1−τi
t. The
tax can also be interpreted as an income tax at rate τi
t on income of unity. It is assumed
that 0 ≤ τi
t ≤ 1 so the endowment can be fully taxed. The incumbent can also divert tax
revenue of amount ri
t up to a maximum level of r ≤ 1 per region in period t.B o t h v o t e r s
and politicians have the same discount factor, 0 <δ<1.
In each region in each time period, the unit cost ci
t of producing the public good
from the private good can take on one of two values: ci
t ∈ {cL,c H} with cL <c H.T h e
determination of ci
t is described in more detail below. With decentralization, there is a











t are the rents diverted from tax revenue (if any) in region i. With centralization,
the policy-maker is assumed to be able to pool tax revenues, and so faces a single budget













where rt are the rents (if any) diverted from aggregate tax revenue.12
It is a widely observed "stylized fact" that centrally set tax rates are uniform across
regions, and consequently, almost all the literature on ﬁscal centralization assumes that
the tax rate is uniform with centralization i.e. τi
t = τt. We do not wish to impose the
assumption ex ante, for reasons discussed at the end of this section.
12Note that as the budget constraint is national, only the aggregate rent matters.
8Politicians may be of two types, ”good” and ”bad”. In particular, in either region,
both the initial incumbent and the challenger at the election are ”good” with probability
π and ”bad” with probability 1−π. Politicians may diﬀer in competence or benevolence,
giving rise to two variants of the model.
Benevolence. A ”good” politician derives utility only from the welfare of the voters
in his jurisdiction: in particular, he maximizes the sum or average of these utilities. A
bad politician cares only about discounted sum of rents diverted. Either type is equally
competent in producing the public good. The cost of the public good is high in any region
and period with probability q ≥ 0.5.13
Competence. Any politician maximizes the discounted sum of rents diverted; condi-
tional on this, he has a lexicographic secondary preference for supplying the public good
at its optimal level. The public good is provided via a technology where the probability qi
t
t h a tt h eu n i tc o s ti sh i g hi nr e g i o ni at time t is (i) uncorrelated across time and regions,
and (ii) is conditional on the competency of the incumbent. A “good” politician is more
competent than the bad. In particular, if the incumbent is good, then qi
t =0 , and if the
incumbent is bad, qi
t = q, with 1 >q>0.
Finally, we state our assumptions about the information voters have about ﬁscal policy
in other regions. we study three possible scenarios:
1. Full voter information; at time t, t h ev o t e r si ni can observe (gi
t,τi
t)i=1,..n :
2. Partial voter information; at time t, t h ev o t e r si ni can observe only (gi
t,τi
t):
3. Uniform taxation:a t t i m e t, the voters in i can observe only (gi
t,τi
t), but the
constraint is imposed that τi
t = τt, all i.
The third scenario is of interest because so much of the literature on ﬁscal decentral-
ization assumes uniform taxation: in this case, voters in one region eﬀectively observe
spending in other regions, but they do not know whether spending in other regions is on
public goods or rents.
2.2. A Benchmark
Note that in this model, there is an agency problem between voters and the incumbent:
the former can only imperfectly control the behavior of the latter through electoral incen-
tives. Note also that in setting up this model, we have abstracted from the usual features
that generate a diﬀerence between centralization and decentralization in the established
13Imposing this constraint on q rules out the ”hybrid” equilibrium of Besley and Smart (2003). The
reason for this is discussed further in Section 3 below.
9literature: there are no economies of scale, there are no spillovers between regions, vot-
ers do not diﬀer in tastes for the public good, either within or between regions14.S o ,
the diﬀerence in outcome between centralization and decentralization is entirely due to
the diﬀerence in the extent to which the voters can control, or hold accountable, the
incumbent, in the two cases.
To see this, it is helpful to consider the benchmark in the benevolence model where
there is no agency problem i.e. where politicians are ”good” with probability 1. In
this case, it is clear that there is an equilibrium where the incumbent will always be
re-elected,15 and in either region and period, the incumbent will provide the public good
eﬃciently, conditional on cost cL or cH. T h i si st r u ew h e t h e rt h e r ei sc e n t r a l i z a t i o n
or decentralization. Of course, eﬃcient public good provision, denoted gk,k = L,H is
implicitly deﬁned by the Samuelson rule H0(gk)=ck. Finally, as the distribution of costs
is the same under decentralization and centralization, it follows that public good provision
and therefore expected voter welfare must also be the same. In Section 8, we demonstrate
that similar equivalence would arise under complete contracting.
2.3. Relation to the Literature
The model of competence is based on the career concerns model of Persson and Tabellini(2000),
but with the key diﬀerence that in our model, there is initially asymmetric information, as
the incumbent is initially informed about his type, as in Rogoﬀ(1990) This means that in
equilibrium, the degree of selection is endogenous, as explained in the introduction. The
model of benevolence is an n−region generalization of Besley and and Smart (2003). We
should stress that in their paper, they do not consider centralized decision-making as we
have deﬁned it here: their benchmark is decentralization without ”competition” between
regions, and then the impact on selection and incentive eﬀects of introducing either tax
or yardstick competition is studied. Finally, Kotsogiannis. and Schwager (2004) consider
14Also, by taking a ﬁxed number of incumbents and challengers, we assume away free entry and rule out
the district magnitude eﬀect bias in favor of centralization (that larger electoral districts lower barriers to
entry and favor competition improving political discipline and selection). The district magnitude eﬀect
is related to the idea suggested by Myerson (1993) that electoral rules promoting the entry of many
candidates protect voters against corruption in a better way. Myerson (1999) gives an overview of the
performance of diﬀerent electoral systems and Persson et al (2000) give evidence of the district magnitude
eﬀect.
15There can be other equilibria where the incumbent is no re-elected, as all voters are always indiﬀerent
between incumbent and challenger, but these will generate the same outcome as the ﬁrst one when there
is no agency problem.
10a two-region model of policy innovation and elections, which is more loosely related to
this one16.
3. Decentralization
We solve backward to obtain a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium in either region.17 In the
second period, the honest policy-maker will provide optimal public good level gk given the
cost realization ck, and set tax τk = ckgk. The dishonest policy-maker will just thus take
maximum rent by setting a tax of τ = r, and providing no public good i.e. g =0 . So, all
voters prefer the honest policy-maker.
In the ﬁrst-period, assume for the moment that good incumbent in either region will
be elected with probability 1 if he behaves non-strategically i.e. makes exactly the same
policy choices as in the second period. We will shortly verify when this is equilibrium
behavior for the voters. In this case, the best strategy for the good incumbent is to behave
non-strategically.
As for the bad type, when cost is high, he always prefers to take maximum rent in
the ﬁrst period, rather than imitate the good type in exchange for re-election: this is
because discounting the future, it is better to take maximum rent now, and nothing later,
rather than the opposite. When cost is low, the bad type has only two options that may
potentially be optimal. First, he can set (gH,τ H) and take ˆ r = gH(cH −cL) in the form
of rents: call this the pooling strategy. Second, he can set g =0 , and take maximal rents,
by setting τ = r : call this the separating strategy.
We are assuming for the moment that any incumbent who chooses (gH,τ H) will be re-
elected. So, when cost is low, the payoﬀs to separating and pooling for the bad incumbent
are r + δ.0 and ˆ r + δ.r respectively. There is therefore a pooling equilibrium, where the
bad politician imitates the good one when the cost of public good provision is low, and
is re-elected with probability 1 in that event if ˆ r + δ.r ≥ r, i.e. ˆ r ≥ (1 − δ)r,a n da
separating equilibrium where bad politician does not imitate the good one even when the
cost of public good provision is low if ˆ r ≤ (1 − δ)r.
16In their model, there are two regions, but the two regimes studied are not ﬁscal centralization and
decentralization in the conventional sense. Rather, they compare a unitary system, where a national
policy-maker chooses whether to innovate in policy or not (a binary choice) in either region, to federal
system, where two incumbents initially choose policy innovation at the regional level, and then run in an
election to be national policy-maker (president) in the second period.
17Obviously, the results in this section recapitulate Section 3 of Besley and Smart (2003): the reader
is referred to that paper for deeper discussion of the issues.
11To conﬁrm that the pooling equilibrium exists, we only need conﬁrm that voters are
willing to re-elect the incumbent if they observe18 (gH,τ H). A voter’s posterior belief that
the incumbent is good i.e. benevolent, conditional on observing (gH,τ H) is
q(τH,g H)=
πq
πq +( 1− π)(1 − q)
(3.1)
Note from (3.1) that as q ≥ 0.5,q (τH,g H) ≥ π, so the voters are indeed willing to re-elect
the incumbent after observing (gH,τ H).




q if ˆ r>(1 − δ)r
1 if ˆ r<(1 − δ)r
(3.2)
It is convenient for what follows to show sD as a function of the discount factor, δ. This
is done in Figure 1. It is clear that δ s a key parameter here, as the higher δ, the greater
the incentives for pooling, and thus the lower is the separation probability.
[insert ﬁg1h e r e ]
Finally, note the role of the assumption that q ≥ 0.5. This rules out the scenario where
the incumbent wants to pool by setting τH,g H, assuming that he can be re-elected, but
the voters place a low probability on ci = cH, and thus will not be willing to re-elect the
incumbent if he sets τH,g H. In this case i.e. when q<0.5, and ˆ r>(1 − δ)r, Besley
and Smart construct a hybrid equilibrium, where both the bad incumbent and voters
randomize. However, for some parameter values this equilibrium does not satisfy the
Cho-Kreps stability criterion (Lockwood(2005)). The reason is that the ”good ” type has
an incentive to strategically distort public good provision when cost is high to signal his
type to the electorate, in order to avoid being replaced by a (possibly) bad challenger.
In this case, a stable fully separating equilibrium can be constructed. We wish to avoid
these rather technical issues, and do so by assuming q ≥ 0.5.
4. Centralization with Full Voter Information
4.1. Equilibrium
We solve backward. In the second-period, the benevolent policy-maker will provide opti-
mal public good level in each region given local costs and charge a tax equal to the cost.
18As a bad incumbent will never set τL,g L, then voters are always willing to re-elect the incumbent
having observed τL,g L.
12The non-benevolent policy-maker will provide no public good and take maximum rent,
regardless of the cost conﬁguration. So, all voters prefer the benevolent policy-maker in
period 2. In the ﬁrst-period, the benevolent incumbent behaves non-strategically and so
will make exactly the same policy choices as in the second period.
So, it remains to characterize the ﬁrst-period behavior of the non-benevolent incum-
bents. At the end of the ﬁrst period, all voters observe (gi,τi)i=1,...n. Now, if an incumbent
extracts maximum rents in one region (by setting gi =0 ,τi = r) this will be observable
by the voters in the other regions, and the incumbent will thus reveal his type and lose
the election.19 This means that there are only two ﬁrst-period strategies that are poten-
tially optimal: pooling, which is (gi,τi)=( gH,τH),i=1 ,..n, and separating, which is
(gi,τi)=( 0 ,r),i=1 ,..n.Finally, say a region is high-cost (low-cost) if ci
1 = cH (ci
1 = cL).
We then have the following result:
Proposition 1. Assume that q ≥ (1/2)1/n. Suppose that k ∈ {0,1,..n} of the regions
are high cost. If k = n, the incumbent always separates. If k<n ,the incumbent pools
if ˆ r ≥ n
n−k(1 − δ)r = rk and separates otherwise.
Note the key feature of Proposition 1: the more high-cost regions there are, the higher
ﬁrst-period rent ˆ r has to be to induce the bad incumbent to pool. Note also that we
make an assumption that q ≥ (1/2)1/n : this plays the role of ruling out a possible hybrid
equilibrium, as in the decentralization case.
4.2. Separation Probabilities
Note that rk is strictly increasing in k, and strictly so when the rk are strictly positive,
with rn =+ ∞. So, we can write down a formula for the ex ante probability of separation
Let pk be the probability that k or fewer regions are high-cost20. Then:
sF =
(
1 − pk,r k ≤ ˆ r<r k+1,k=0 ,1..n − 1
1, ˆ r<r 0 =( 1− δ)r
(4.1)
The explanation is as follows. If rk ≤ ˆ r<r k+1, the incumbent pools only if there
are k or fewer high-cost regions, which occurs with probability pk so he separates with
complementary probability 1 − pk. If ˆ r<r 0, the incumbent separates no matter what k
is.
19We call this the ”information consolidation”e ﬀect of centralization.
20Note pk =P r ( X ≤ k), where X is a random variable with a Binomial distribution with parameters
q,n.
13How does sF compare to sD? It is convenient to use the Figure 1 above to illustrate
this. The separation probability sF as a function of δ, is superimposed on Figure 1 to
give Figure 2.
[Insert Fig 2 here]
.W h e n δ is low, i.e. below 1 − ˆ r
r, separation always occurs, even if all regions are
low-cost. When δ is high, i.e. above 1− ˆ r
nr, separation never occurs, unless all regions are
high-cost, which occurs with probability qn. Generally, sF is monotonically decreasing in
δ. Note that sF can be above or below sD. For low values of δ separation always occurs
in either regime, and for high values of δ, sF <s D, so that there is more pooling in
equilibrium with.centralization If, for example, δ ≥ 1 − ˆ r
nr, the bad incumbent is harder
to ”detect” than with decentralization, as he only reveals himself when all regions are
high-cost (whereas the bad incumbent with decentralization reveals himself whenever his
own region only is high-cost). But, note that because q<1−(1−q)3 ≤ 1−(1−q)n, there
will always be an intermediate range of values of δ for which sF >s D. That is, when δ
is in the intermediate region, the bad incumbent is easier to ”detect” for the voters than
with decentralization , as he reveals himself in all cases except when all regions are low-
cost, whereas with decentralization, the incumbent reveals himself when his own region
is high-cost.
The intuition is as follows. Note that the opportunity cost (per region) of pooling
with centralization is simply one nth of maximum rent with separation, nk minus the
maximum rent with pooling ˆ r(n − k) i.e. r − ˆ r(1 − k
n
˙ ) This increases quite smoothly
with k, especially when n is large. This is to be contrasted with the decentralization case,
where the opportunity cost of pooling, i.e. r−ˆ r(1−k˙ ) k ∈ {0,1}, changes discontinuously
when k rises from zero to 1. So, we will call the diﬀerence in opportunity costs across
the opportunity cost eﬀect. With full information, this is the only diﬀerence between
centralization and decentralization.
Also, note that Figure 2 illustrates nicely that the Baron-Besanko(1992) information
consolidation argument, according to which the principal can more easily detect com-
petence when the agent (incumbents) performs in several regions, does not translate
immediately to our incomplete contract context. The reason is because the agent (in-
cumbent) decides when to make the information available to the principal. So separation
probabilities can go either way.
144.3. Voter Welfare
We now turn to welfare analysis. Let EWF,E W D be the expected present value of welfare
to the voter of any region calculated at the beginning of period 1, before the type of the
incumbent and the cost shocks are determined, under full-information centralization and
decentralization respectively. .
It is useful to develop the formulae for EWF,E W D as they will make clear that the
welfare ranking of centralization and decentralization depends entirely on the separation
probabilities. Deﬁne
Wk = H(gk) − ckgk, ˆ W = qWH +( 1− q)WL, ˜ W = π ˆ W − (1 − π)r
where ˆ W and ˜ W denote the expected welfare produced by a good incumbent and by
a challenger, respectively. Then, with both centralization and decentralization, second -
period expected utility in a region, given that the bad incumbent in that region separates
with probability s, is
EW2(s)=π ˆ W +( 1− π)[s ˜ W +( 1− s)(−r)] (4.2)
The explanation is as follows. With probability π the ﬁrst-period incumbent is good,
in which case he stays in oﬃce with probability 1, and delivers expected utility ˜ W to
the voters in the region. With probability 1 − π the ﬁrst-period incumbent is bad. If he
does not separate, which occurs with probability 1 − s, he will be re-elected and extract
maximum rent in the last period. If he separates, he is replaced by a challenger which is
good (bad) with probability π (1 −π). This challenger therefore delivers expected utility
of ˜ W.
Now consider period 1 payoﬀs, conditional on separation probabilities. With either
decentralization or centralization, the ﬁrst-period expected payoﬀ is
EW1(s)=π ˆ W +( 1− π)[s(−r)+( 1− s)WH] (4.3)
The explanation is the following. With probability π the ﬁrst-period incumbent is
good, in which case he delivers expected utility ˆ W to the voters in the region. With
probability 1−π the ﬁrst-period incumbent is bad. If he separates, he extracts maximum
rent. If pools, which occurs with probability 1 − s, he always does so by setting gH,τH
w h e nt h et r u ec o s ti sl o w .
So, using (4.2),(4.3), the equilibrium welfares with centralization and decentralization
are
EWD = EW1(sD)+δEW2(sD),E W F = EW1(sF)+δEW2(sF) (4.4)
15So, the diﬀerence can be decomposed as follows:
EWF − EWD =[ EW1(sF)+δEW2(sF) − (EW1(sD)+δEW2(sD))] (4.5)
=( sF − sD)(1 − π)[−(WH + r)+δ( ˜ W + r)]
=( sF − sD)(1 − π)[−(WH + r)+δπ( ˆ W + r)]
Remembering that WH, ˆ W and r are parameters, it follows that the welfare comparison
depends entirely on whether the separation probability is smaller or larger with decentral-
ization than with centralization. Moreover, note that ∆S ≡ ˆ W +r is the selection beneﬁt
of separation: if a bad incumbent is replaced by a challenger, the challenger will be good
with probability π, in which case he gives the voters ˜ W rather than −r in the second
period). .Moreover, ∆I ≡ WH + r is the incentive cost of separation (the bad incumbent
gives the voters −r rather than WH in the ﬁrst period). We have therefore proved the
following:
Proposition 2. With either ﬁscal arrangement, voter welfare is increasing in the sep-
aration probability if ∆I/∆S >δ π .In this case, voter welfare is higher with whichever
arrangement gives the higher separation probability. With either ﬁscal arrangement,
voter welfare is decreasing in the separation probability if ∆I/∆S <δ π .In this case,
voter welfare is lower with whichever arrangement gives the higher separation probability.
If ∆I/∆S = δπ, voters are always indiﬀerent between centralization and decentralization.
The condition determining voter preference over separation is intuitive. The beneﬁts
of separation come in the second period, and only occur with probability π. So, δ and π
must be suﬃciently high for voters to prefer separation.
5. Centralization with Partial Voter Information
5.1. Equilibrium
Second-period behavior of an incumbent of a given type (good or bad) is the same as
with full voter information. So, all voters prefer the benevolent policy-maker in period 2.
In the ﬁrst-period, the benevolent incumbent behaves non-strategically and so will make
exactly the same policy choices as in the second period.
To analyze the ﬁrst-period behavior of the non-benevolent incumbents, we introduce
the following terminology. The incumbent separates in region i if he chooses gi,τi 6=
(gL,τL) or (gH,τH), and pools in region i otherwise. As voters only observe ﬁscal policy
16in their own region, all voters in i vote for the incumbent if he pools, and for the challenger
otherwise. So, w.l.o.g, we can assume that if the incumbent separates in region i, he sets
(gi,τi)=( 0 ,r). Also, say that an incumbent separates overall if he only chooses to pool
in a minority of regions, and pools overall otherwise. An incumbent wins the election if
and only if he pools overall. Thus, the selection eﬀect, i.e. the ex ante probability that
he is de-selected if ”bad” - which is the focus of our analysis - is the probability that he
separates overall.
Proposition 3. Suppose that k of the regions are high cost. If k<m=( n +1 ) /2,
(a majority of low cost regions) the incumbent pools in m low-cost regions, separates in
the other regions, and thus pools overall if ˆ r ≥ max{(1 − n
mδ)r,0} = r and separates
in all regions otherwise. If k ≥ m, (majority of high cost regions) the incumbent will






r,0} ≡ rk. In this case, the incumbent wins the
election by pooling in all n−k low-cost regions, and k−m+1randomly selected high-cost
regions, and separates in the other regions.
Note that as in the case of full information, the more high-cost regions there are, the
higher ﬁrst-period rent ˆ r has to be to induce the bad incumbent to pool. however, the
critical value of ˆ r is lower than in the case of full voter information (for a formal proof,
see Section 5.4 below), as the incumbent now has the option (which he takes) of selective
rent-diversion. Note now that we only need the condition q ≥ 0.5 as now the inference
problem facing the voter in any region is the same as with decentralization.
5.2. Separation Probabilities
We assume in this section that δ<m
n, because if the opposite is true, the separation
probability is always zero, from Proposition 3. If δ<m
n,note that rk is increasing in k,
and strictly so when the rk are strictly positive, with rn =+ ∞.A g a i n , d e ﬁne pk to be
the probability that the number of high-cost regions is less than or equal to k. Then the





1, 0 ≤ ˆ r<r
1 − pm−1,r ≤ ˆ r<r m
1 − pk,r k ≤ ˆ r<r k+1,k≥ m
(5.1)
The explanation is as follows. If ˆ r<r , then the incumbent always separates. If r ≤ ˆ r<
rm, the incumbent pools only if k ≤ m − 1, which occurs with probability pm−1, so he
separates with complementary probability 1−pm−1. If rk ≤ ˆ r<r k+1, then the incumbent
17only separates if the number of high-cost regions is greater than k, which occurs with
probability 1 − pk.
How does sP compare to sD? Again, it is convenient to use Figure 1 above to illustrate
this. The separation probability sP as a function of δ, is superimposed on Figure 1 to
give Figure 3.
[insert ﬁg3h e r e ]
Here, for clarity, we have assumed n =3 . When δ is low, i.e. below 2
3 − ˆ r
r, separation
always occurs. When δ is high, i.e. above 2
3 − ˆ r
3r, separation does not occur unless all
regions are high-cost, which occurs with probability q3. In between these two values of
δ, separation only occurs with partial information if at least two regions are high-cost,
an event which occurs with probability q3 +3 q2(1 − q). In that case, it is possible that
q3 +3 q2(1 − q) >q :f o re x a m p l e ,i fq = 3




Thus, separation can be more likely with centralization even with the possibility of
selective pooling. On the other hand, as we will see below, separation is unambiguously
less likely under partial information than it is under full information.
The intuition is simply that there are now two determinants of sP. A si nt h ec a s eo f
sF, the opportunity cost eﬀect is still at work. But now, overlaid on this eﬀect is the
selective pooling eﬀect which implies that sP <s F. But. the opportunity cost can still
dominate, implying that we can get sP >s D, as above.
5.3. Voter Welfare
As before, with both centralization and decentralization, second -period expected utility
in a region, given that the bad incumbent in that region separates with probability s,
is EW2(s), deﬁned in (4.2) above. Now consider period 1 payoﬀs, conditional on sepa-
ration probabilities. With decentralization, the ﬁrst-period expected payoﬀ is EW1(s) as
deﬁned above. So, the overall payoﬀ to decentralization is as before.
Now consider the ﬁrst-period expected payoﬀ with centralization. With partial voter
information, there is a distinction between separating (or pooling ) in the aggregate, and
at the level of the individual region. In particular, as is clear from Proposition 3, when
the bad incumbent separates in the aggregate, he does so by separating in each region
(i.e. by taking maximum rent), but when he pools, he does so in the minimum number
of regions needed to win the election i.e. m regions. That is, in the event of pooling in
the aggregate, the expected payoﬀ to a region is (1 − m
n)(−r)+m
nWH, as the incumbent
selects m regions out of n i nw h i c ht op o o l( a sd e s c r i b e di nt h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 ) .
18As all regions are ex ante identical, the ex ante probability of being selected is therefore
m
n. So, the expected payoﬀ with separation probability s is
EW
P











where the second term is the welfare cost of selective pooling. This is decomposed as
follows. With probability 1 − π, the incumbent is bad. If this incumbent pools overall
(s =0 ) , then with probability (1 − m
n), any region will be chosen to be amongst the
unfortunate n − m r e g i o n sw h e r et h ei n c u m b e n tt a k e sm a x i m u mr e n tb ys e t t i n gg =
0,τ= r,r a t h e rt h a nr e n tˆ r by setting g = gH,τ = τH. The cost to any such region of
this is ∆I.




So, the diﬀerence can be decomposed as follows:





1 (sP) − EW1(sP)
¤
=( sP − sD)(1 − π)[−∆I + δπ∆S] (5.4)




As is clear from (5.4), there are now two eﬀects on welfare of moving to centralization:
1. A change in the separation probability, evaluated using the decentralized welfare
criterion:
2. A reduction in welfare at a given separation probability, because limits on rent-
diversion are only needed in a majority of regions (instead of all regions) to be reelected
-t h eselective pooling eﬀect,
In general, these two eﬀects could go either way. However, we have:
Proposition 4. If δ>max{
∆I
π∆S, m




n}, then examples can be found when EWD <E W P.




n, so from Proposition 3, sP =0 . Also,
δπ >
∆I
∆S, so −∆I + δπ∆S > 0. But then as sD ≥ sP, the result follows from (5.4).
(ii) See Example 1 below. ¤
19The intuition for the general result is as follows. When δ is high, voters prefer a higher
separation probability, because the beneﬁts of separation come in the second period. But
when δ is high, the incentive to pool with centralization is very strong, as the policy-maker
only need sacriﬁce rent-extraction in m
n of the regions to be elected in the ﬁrst period,
thus gaining second-period rents in all regions. So, voters are worse oﬀ with centralization
both because the separation probability is lower, and because they prefer decentralization
at a given separation probability, due to the selective pooling eﬀect.
To generate an example where centralization is preferred, a necessary condition is that
voters dislike separation ( i.e. δπ is low enough). But that is not suﬃcient: we require
also that the gain from greater pooling under centralization oﬀsets the loss from selective
pooling eﬀe c t .B u tt h i si sp o s s i b l ei fδ is low enough, as the following example shows.








. Then, (5.1) gives the relevant separation
probabilities. Assume ˆ r is such that (1 − 3
2δ)r ≤ ˆ r<(1 − δ)r. Then, sD =1 ,s P =
q3 +3 q2(1 − q). Further, let q =0 .5. Then, sP = 1
2. Then from (5.4),



























which is the required result. ¤
5.4. Comparing Partial and Full Voter Information
We are now in a position to ask what the eﬀects on separation probabilities and voter
welfares are of switching from partial to full voter information, given centralization. In
an incomplete contracting framework such as this, one should not presume that more
information is better, and indeed that is not the case. However, it is possible to establish
that conditional on a ﬁxed separation probability, voter prefer full information. Our
results here are:
Proposition 5. (i) A change from partial to full voter information always increases sep-
aration probabilities (ii) A change from partial to full voter information always increases
voter welfare, conditional on a ﬁxed s : (iii) A change from partial to full voter infor-
mation will always increase voter welfare unconditionally if δπ >
∆I
∆S, but if δπ <
∆I
∆S,
examples can be found where a move from partial to full voter information will decrease
voter welfare.
20The reason of part (i) of Proposition 5 is that pooling is more proﬁtable with partial
information as the incumbent has to restrain rent diversion in only a majority of regions
(instead of all regions). As already remarked, part (iii) of Proposition 5 is comparable
to Proposition 5 of Besley and Smart(2003). In the context of decentralized ﬁscal policy,
they demonstrate that yardstick competition between regions (which can only occur when
voters are fully informed in our sense) does not necessarily increase voter welfare relative to
no yardstick competition. However, in our case, the mechanism at work is quite diﬀerent.
6. Centralization with Uniform Taxation
6.1. Equilibrium
Again, second-period behavior of an incumbent of a given type (good or bad) is the same
as with full voter information. So, all voters prefer the benevolent policy-maker in period
2. In the ﬁrst-period, the benevolent incumbent behaves non-strategically and so will make
exactly the same policy choices as in the second period.
To analyze the ﬁrst-period behavior of the non-benevolent incumbents, we introduce
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This is the set of uniform tax rates that can possibly be set by a good incumbent in
equilibrium. Say that the bad incumbent pools with respect to taxation τ ∈ T. Also, say
that the bad incumbent pools with respect to expenditure in region i if gi ∈ {gL,g H}. Note
that in order to be re-elected, a bad incumbent must (i) pool with respect to taxation,
and (ii) pool with respect to expenditure in at least m regions. So, (assuming that q is
high enough that voters will re-elect the incumbent even if they observe a tax τ = τH) the
cheapest way to be re-elected for the bad incumbent is to pool with respect to taxation
by setting τ to the maximum value in T i.e. τH, and pool with respect to expenditure in
exactly m regions by setting gi = gH in those regions. Once this observation is made, the
next result follows easily;
Proposition 6. Assume q ≥ (1
2)1/n. Suppose that k of the regions are high cost. If
k<m ,the incumbent sets τ = τH, and gi = gH in m low-cost regions and gi =0
elsewhere, and is thus re-elected if
mˆ r+(n−m)τH
n ≥ (1−δ)r : otherwise, he separates and is
not re-elected. If k ≥ m, the incumbent sets τ = τH, and gi = gH in all n − k low-cost
regions and m−(n−k) high-cost regions, and gi =0elsewhere, and is thus re-elected, if
(n−k)ˆ r+(n−m)τH
n ≥ (1 − δ)r : otherwise, he separates and is not re-elected.
216.2. Separation Probabilities
Now we turn to a characterization of separation probabilities. Let r,r k solve
mr +( n − m)τH
n
=( 1− δ)r,
(n − k)rk +( n − m)τH
n
=( 1− δ)r, k ≥ m (6.1)
respectively. Then clearly r < (1 − δ)r since τH > b r.N o t e a l s o t h a t a s n − k<m
for k ≥ m, rk >rand rk is increasing with rn = ∞. Then the ex-ante probability
of separation is given by (5.1) above, but with r,r k as deﬁned in (6.1). We can again
compare separation probabilities sD and sU using the fact that r < (1 − δ)r.V e r ym u c h
along the lines of the case of partial voter information, it can be shown that ”usually”
sU <s D, but cases can be found where sU >s D.
6.3. Voter Welfare
The computation of voter welfare is similar to the case of partial information, except that
ﬁr s t - p e r i o dw e l f a r ei sn o w
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The reason is as follows. In the event of a bad incumbent pooling with uniform taxation,
the expected payoﬀ to a region is (1 − m
n)(−τH)+m
nWH, as the incumbent selects m
regions out of n in which to pool (delivering welfare WH in each), as the maximal rent
the incumbent can extract in the n − m r e g i o n si sr e s t r a i n e dt ot h eu n i f o r mt a xτH.
6.4. Comparing Diﬀerentiated and Uniform Taxes
As mentioned in the introduction, our results have some interesting implications for the
choice between diﬀerentiated and uniform taxes. Assume (as is probably reasonable),
that voters only have partial information at the voting stage i.e. they only observe ex-
penditure and the tax rate in their own region, and at a constitutional stage, they have
to choose between uniform and diﬀerentiated taxes. This amounts to comparing EWP
and EWU. In our model, a shift from diﬀerentiated to uniform taxes will have two eﬀects.
First, at a given separation probability, it will increase voter welfare as it constrains the
ability of the incumbent to extract rents without being detected. Second, it will raise the
equilibrium separation probability, as - for the same reason - pooling is less proﬁtable for
22the incumbent. This allows us to identify simple conditions under which voters prefer to
choose a uniform tax.
Proposition 7. Assume that voters can only observe expenditure and the tax rate in
their own region. Then, with (i) with uniform taxation, the separation probability is at




welfare is strictly higher with uniform than with diﬀerentiated taxes.
7. The Competence Model
Here, we brieﬂy sketch results for the competence model. The purpose of this section is
simply to emphasize that for the most part, the results already obtained carry over to the
competence case.
7.1. Decentralization
In the second period, both good and bad incumbents will extract maximum rent r.H a v i n g
done that, they wish to supply the good as close as possible to the eﬃcient level in each
region, whatever the cost. We will assume that gk > (1−r)/ck =˜ gk i.e. having extracted
maximum rent, the maximum possible public good supply -given the maximum tax
rate of unity - is less than the eﬃcient level. So, an incumbent with cost ck supplies
˜ gk =( 1−r)/ck,k= H,L. So, all voters prefer a competent to an incompetent incumbent,
since public good supply is higher.
Now consider the ﬁrst period. Assume for the moment that good incumbent in either
region will be elected with probability 1 if he behaves non-strategically i.e. makes exactly
the same policy choices as in the second period. We will shortly verify when this is
equilibrium behavior for the voters. In this case, the best strategy for the good incumbent
is to behave non-strategically.
Now consider the bad incumbent in i. First, note that by Bayes’ rule, the voters’




π +( 1− π)σ
≥ π
where σ is the probability that in equilibrium, a bad incumbent sets (gL,1). For the voters
to be willing to re-elect the incumbent, we require π0 ≥ π, which is true for all σ ∈ [0,1]
so, the voters are always willing to re-elect in equilibrium the incumbent whenever he
pools. So, if his cost is low (ci = cL) he cannot do better than imitate (pool with) the
good incumbent, because if he imitates, he will be re-elected while extracting maximum
23rent. If his cost is high, (ci = cH) he has two possible options. The ﬁrst is to imitate the
tax and expenditure of the good incumbent i.e. set (gi,τi)=( ˜ gL,1), which leaves him
with reduced rent of ˆ r<r ,where






giving him payoﬀ ˆ r + δr. The second is to separate by taking maximum rent and thus
setting (gi,τi)=( ˜ gH,1), thus losing the election and giving him payoﬀ r + δ.0. So, will
pool if ˆ r>(1 − δ)r, and separate otherwise.




0 if ˆ r>(1 − δ)r
q if ˆ r<(1 − δ)r
Comparing with the benevolence model, the separation probability is lower in the
competence model because when cost is high the incumbents do not separate if ˆ r>(1−δ)r;
and when cost is low the incumbent never separates, no matter ˆ r. In the benevolence model
there is always separation when cost is high and separation is also possible when cost is
low if ˆ r<(1 − δ)r.
7.2. Centralization
With centralization, again three diﬀerent possibilities can be analyzed: full information,
partial information, and uniform taxation. The qualitative results are very similar to the
case of benevolence, with two key exceptions. So, to avoid excessive re-statement of very
similar propositions (full details are available on request from the authors), we will just
note these exceptions.
First, the partial information case and uniform taxation case are the same in the
competence model since both good and bad incumbents always set the same maximum
tax of τ =1in equilibrium. This leaves only two cases for consideration, full and partial
information. In both of these cases, unlike in the benevolence case, voter welfare is
always decreasing in the separation probability. The reason for this is straightforward.
Let Wk = H(˜ gk) − 1 be the payoﬀ to a voter from an incumbent who behaves as if he
has cost ck,k= L,H. Then, in period 1, if the bad incumbent separates rather than
pools in a region, he delivers WH rather than WL to the voters, so the current loss from
separation is WL−WH. The expected future gain is that next period’s incumbent will be
high-cost with probability only (1 − π)q, rather than q, i m p l y i n gag a i ni nv o t e rw e l f a r e
of δπq(WL − WH). So, it is not surprising that voters are worse oﬀ with separation as it
24involves a cost in the ﬁrst-period that is certain against an equal-size beneﬁt in the next-
period that is uncertain and discounted. All the propositions above hold, appropriately
restated, taking into account the diﬀerences just noted.
Second, on voter welfare. With full voter information, voter welfare is higher with
whichever arrangement gives the lower separation probability: this is the analog of Propo-
sition 2. With partial information, given the same separation probability, decentraliza-
tion dominates centralization, due to selective pooling eﬀect which is also present in the
competence model with partial information. Nevertheless, examples can be found where
centralization dominates; these involve a lower separation probability with centralization.
This is the analog of Proposition 4. Note in this case, the cost and beneﬁt of decentral-
ization is particularly clear: it prevents selective pooling, to the beneﬁt of voters, but will
usually increase the separation probability, to the cost of voters.
8. Some Extensions
8.1. The Rent Scale Eﬀect
As emphasized by Seabright(1996), an important determinant of incumbent incentives
with centralization (relative to decentralization) is the total size of second-period rents
from oﬃce as a function of the number of jurisdictions under the incumbent’s control,
n. So far, to focus on the analytics of the selective pooling eﬀect, we have made enough
assumptions so that this is linear in n. In particular, second period rents accruing to the
winner of the election: in our model is r with decentralization, and nr with centralization.
In Hindriks and Lockwood(2005), diminishing returns in n is introduced in a simple and
plausible way, by assuming that there is also an exogenous ego-rent R from oﬃce21.I t
is then shown that the smaller the rent scale eﬀect, i.e. the larger R, the larger sF/sD
or sP/sD. This is intuitive: if the gains to second -period oﬃce with centralization fall
(relative to decentralization), the incentives for separation rise. What is more interesting
is that the welfare eﬀect of an increase in R is ambiguous.
8.2. Region-SpeciﬁcC o m p e t e n c e
So far, we have assumed that the unknown characteristic of the incumbent - benevo-
lence or competence - pertains to the incumbent, rather than the region. In the case
21Then, second period rents accruing to the winner of the election is now r + R with decentralization,
and nr + R with centralization i.e. diminishing returns.
25of benevolence, this is more plausible: it would be hard to explain why an incumbent
w o u l db eb e n e v o l e n ti no n er e g i o na n dr e n t - s e e k i n gi na n o t h e r . O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i n
t h ec o m p e t e n c em o d e l ,i ti sq u i t en a t u r a lt ot h i n ko ft h ec o m p e t e n c ec h a r a c t e r i s t i cb e i n g
determined at the regional level, even with centralization. Indeed, this is in some respects
a more attractive assumption than the one we have made in the previous section, as it
means that the joint distribution of costs of producing the public goods across regions in
the ﬁrst period is unchanged following a move from decentralization to centralization.22
This case is analysed in Hindriks and Lockwood(2005), and the results are quite similar.
8.3. Complete Contracting
In our model, elections only give voters limited control over the incumbent, relative to
a complete contract which can also reward the incumbent for performance i.e. all the
voters can do is ”ﬁre” the incumbent at the end of the ﬁrst period. How sensitive are
our results to this assumed incompleteness? One way to look at this is to write down a
”complete contracting” version of our model, where performance-related pay is also an
instrument, and see how the equilibrium behavior of the incumbent with the optimal
contract diﬀers from the equilibrium in our paper. It should be noted that because the
agent (the incumbent) can diﬀer both by preference type and cost, this is not a standard
contracting problem. However, in the one-period case, because the cost shocks are i.i.d.
across regions, it can be shown (see Appendix B of Hindriks and Lockwood(2005))) that
with complete contracting, it makes no diﬀerence whether the voters contract regionally
i.e. with n diﬀerent regional incumbents or nationally, with one incumbent23.
However, in the two-period case, which is really the relevant case, the voters have an
ex post incentive to ﬁre the bad incumbent if he reveals himself through his ﬁrst-period
choice of contract. In Appendix B, we also consider the two-period contracting problem
22Under the assumption made above, the unconditional average cost is unchanged following this move,
but under centralisation, costs are more highly correlated.
23This is contrast to Baron and Besanko(1992), who ﬁnd that the principal can more easily detect
competence when the agent performs several tasks. However, their set-up is rather diﬀerent. First,
in their paper, the asymmetric information pertains to the production process, rather than the agent
who runs the process; so even with centralization, there are two pieces of information. Second, the goods
produced by the agent(s) are perfect complements: in our setting, they are independent. Third, the results
of their paper do not really capture the feature of our paper that centralization allows the principal to
have ”more observations” on the performance of the agent. In the Baron-Besanko model, centralization
can outperform decentralization, but the intuition is to do with internalization of externalities by the
agent.
26without precommitment. We show that with either ﬁscal regime, it is optimal to oﬀer the
one-period contract in both periods, with the bad incumbent revealing his type if the cost
is low24. So, again we have equivalence of the two regimes with complete contracting.
9. Conclusion
This paper has considered the eﬀects of ﬁscal decentralization on both incentives and
selection of policy-makers. The main message is that (except in the probably unrealis-
tic case where voters have full information about local public good provision across the
economy), bad incumbents can pool worth good ones at lower cost to themselves (but
at a higher cost to voters) with centralization. This has two consequences. First, at a
given separation probability, voter welfare is lower with centralization. But, equilibrium
separation probabilities can be higher or lower with centralization: the forces at work on
the separation probabilities are quite subtle.
Our model presents a ﬁrst step toward addressing the question of the expected eﬀect of
decentralization on government eﬃciency in a systematic fashion by studying jointly the
incentive and selection eﬀects. One possible direction for future work is to study .empiri-
cally separation rates for policy-makers (e.g. legislators or governors) at the national and
subnational levels. While there is an existing political science literature on the determi-
nants of job tenure of politicians (see e.g. Finnoccario and Lin(2000)), to our knowledge,
there has been no investigation of whether expected tenure is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at
diﬀerent levels of government.
Acknowledgements. We are grateful to the participants of the conference on ”Political
Economy and Institutional Performance” (Brussels, June 11-12, 2004), the Workshop on ”Social
Choice and Welfare Economics” (Malaga, June 2-4, 2005), the PET 2005 conference (Marseilles,
16-18 June 2005) and seminar participants at Bristol, Essex, Warwick, Nottingham, Milan and
Louvain for their comments. We would also like to thank Massimo Bordignon, Micael Castan-
heira, Kai Konrad, Nicolas Porteiro, Christian Schultz and Jean Tirole for helful comments on
ap r e v i o u sd r a f t .
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27References
[1] Alesina, A. and E. Spolare (1997), “On the Number and Size of Nations,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112, 1027-56.
[2] Azfar, O., S. Kahkonen, and P. Meagher (2001) ”Conditions for Eﬀective Decen-
tralised Governance: A Synthesis of Research Findings”, (IRIS Center, University of
Maryland).
[3] Bardhan, P. and D. Mookerjeee (2000), ”Capture and Governance at Local and
National Levels,” American Economic Review, 90(2), 135-139.
[4] Baron, D. and D. Besanko (1992), ”Information, Control and Organizational Struc-
ture”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
[5] Banks, J.S. and R.K. Sundaram (1998), ”Optimal Retention in Agency problems”,
Journal of Economic Theory 82, 293-323.
[6] Belleﬂamme, P. and J. Hindriks (2005), ”Yardstick Competition and Political Agency
Problems”, Social Choice and Welfare 24,1 5 5 - 7 0 .
[7] Besley, T. and S. Coate (2003), “Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local
Public Goods: a Political Economy Approach”, Journal of Public Economics, 87,
2611-37.
[8] Besley, T. and M. Smart (2003), “Does Tax Competition Raise Voter Wel-
fare?”.(unpublished, London School of Economics).
[9] Bordignon, Colombo, and Galmarini (2003), ”Fiscal Federalism and Endogenous
Lobbies’ Formation”, (CESIfo Working Paper 1017)
[10] Bolton, P. and G. Roland (1997), “The Break-Up of Nations: A Political Economy
Analysis” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1057-90.
[11] Cremer. J. and T.Palfrey, (1996), “In or Out? Centralization by Majority Vote”,
European Economic Review 40, 43-60.
[12] Ellingsen, T.(1998), “Externalities vs. Internalities: A Model of Political Integra-
tion”, Journal of Public Economics, 68, 251-268.
[13] Faguet, J-P, (2004), ”Does Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to
Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia” Journal of Public Economics 88,6 6 7 - 8 9 3
28[14] Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent performance and electoral control, Public Choice 50,
5-25.
[15] Finnoccario, C.J. and T.Lin(2000), ”The Hazards of Incumbency: An Event-History
Analysis of Congressional Tenure”, (unpublished paper, University of Michigan)
[16] Fissman, R., and R.Gatti (2002) ”Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across
Countries,” Journal of Public Economics, 83(3), 325-45.
[17] Fissman,R. and R.Gatti(2002a), ”Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from
US Transfer Programs”, Public Choice, 113,2 5 - 3 5
[18] Gilbert, G. and P.Picard (1996), “Incentives and the Optimal Size of Local Jurisdic-
tions”, European Economic Review 40,1 9 - 4 3 .
[19] Henderson, J.V, and A.Kuncoro (2004) ”Corruption in Indonesia”, (NBER Working
Paper W10674)
[20] Hindriks, J and B. Lockwood (2005) ”Decentralization and Electoral Accountability:
Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare”, (Warwick Working Paper in Economics,
717)
[21] Huther, J. and A.Shah (1998) ”Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to
the Debate on Fiscal decentralization”, (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
1894).
[22] Kotsogiannis,C. and R.Schwager (2004), "Policy Innovation in Federal Systems",
unpublished paper
[23] Laﬀont, J.-J., and J. Tirole (1998), ”The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts”, Econo-
metrica, 56, 1153-75.
[24] Lockwood, B., (2002), ”Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization”, Review
of Economic Studies, 69(2), 313-337.
[25] Lockwood, B., (2005), ”A Note on the Hybrid Equilibrium in the Besley-Smart
Model””, (Warwick Economics Working Paper 727).
[26] McKinnon, R., T. Nechyba (1997), ”Competition in Federal Systems: Political and
ﬁnancial Constraint”, in J. Ferejohn and B. R. Weingast, eds., The New federalism:
Can the States be Trusted? (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press).
29[27] Mello,L. and M.Barenstein (2001), ”Fiscal Decentralization and Governance: A
Cross-Country Approach”, (IMF Working Paper 01/71).
[28] Myerson, R. (1993), ”Eﬀectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government
Corruption: a Game Theoretic Analysis”, Games and Economic Behavior 5, 118-32.
[29] Myerson, R. (1999), ”Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems” European Eco-
nomic Review 43,6 7 1 - 9 7 .
[30] Oates, W. (1972), Fiscal Federalism, (Harcourt-Brace, New York).
[31] Oates, W (1999), ”An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,” Journal of Economic Literature,
37(3), 1120-49.
[32] Oberholzer-Gee, Felix and Koleman S. Strumpf (2002): ”Endogeneous Policy Decen-
tralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism,” Journal of Political
Economy, 110, 1-36.
[33] Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000), Political Economics: Explaining Economic Pol-
icy, (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.).
[34] Persson, T., G. Tabellini, and F. Trebbi (2000), Electoral Rules and Corruption”
(NBER Working Paper No. 8154).
[35] Rogoﬀ, K. (1990), Equilibrium political budget cycles, American Economic Review
80: 21-37.
[36] Seabright, P. (1996), “Accountability and Decentralization in Government:an Incom-
plete Contracts Model”, European Economic Review 40, 61-91.
[37] Treisman, D, (2000), “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study”, Journal
of Public Economics, 76:3 9 9 - 4 5 7 .
[38] Treisman, Daniel (2002), ”Decentralization and the Quality of Government”, (un-
published paper, Department of Political Science, UCLA).
[39] Wallis, J. and W.E.Oates (1988), “Decentralization in the Public Sector: an Empiri-
cal Study of State and Local Government”, in Rosen, H.J. (ed.), in Fiscal Federalism:
Quantitative Studies, (University of Chicago Press).
[40] World Bank (2000), Entering the 21st Century, (World Development Report).
30A. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose for the moment that the voters are willing to re-elect the
incumbent whenever he pools. Only two strategies can possibly be optimal for the incumbent.
The ﬁrst is to separate, and lose the election which gives him a payoﬀ nr + δ.0. The second is
to pool and win the election. This gives payoﬀ (n−k)ˆ r+δnr. The second strategy is better iﬀ
ˆ r ≥ n
n−k(1 − δ)r = rk. As rn = ∞, it is always best to separate when k = n.
Now we verify that the voters are willing to re-elect the incumbent whenever he pools. By





qnπ +( 1− π)σ
where σ is the probability that in equilibrium, a bad incumbent plays the pooling strategy.
For the voters to be willing to re-elect the incumbent, we require π0 ≥ π, or qn ≥ σ. As
the incumbent always separates when k = n, which occurs with probability qn, the maximum
possible value of σ is σ =1−qn (this occurs when the incumbent pools in all other cost states,
which occurs when ˆ r ≥ n(1 − δ)r). So, for the voters to be willing to re-elect in equilibrium,
we require qn ≥ 1 − qn, or q ≥ (1/2)1/n. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .I f k<m ,there is a majority of low cost regions and only two
strategies can possibly be optimal for the incumbent. The ﬁr s ti st ot a k em a x i m u mr e n ti na l l
regions, thus separating in all regions and lose the election which gives him a payoﬀ nr + δ.0.
The second is to limit his rent to ˆ r in m low-cost regions (thus pooling in those regions),
and take maximum rent in all other regions. This is pooling overall, and thus the incumbent
wins the election. This gives payoﬀ ˆ rm +( n − m)r + δnr. The second strategy is better iﬀ
ˆ r ≥ (1 − n
mδ)r = r.
If k ≥ m, there is a majority of high cost regions and only two strategies can possibly be
optimal for the incumbent. The ﬁrst is to take maximum rent in all regions, thus separating in
all regions and lose the election which gives him a payoﬀ nr+δ.0. T h es e c o n di st ol i m i th i sr e n t
to ˆ r in all n − k low-cost regions (thus pooling in those regions), and limit his rent to zero in
l = m−(n−k) high-cost regions, and take maximum rent in all other regions. This is pooling
overall, and thus the incumbent wins the election. This gives payoﬀ ˆ r(n−k)+l.0+(n−(n−
k) − l)r + δnr =ˆ r(n − k)+( n − m)r + δnr. The second strategy is better iﬀ ˆ r ≥ rk. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) We must show that separation probability is higher with full
voter information. With full information the separation probability sF is as follows. Let rF
k =
n
n−k(1 − δ)r; k ≤ n.I fˆ r<r F
0 , the incumbent separates no matter what k is and sF(ˆ r)=1 .
If rF
k ≤ ˆ r<r F
k+1, the incumbent separates with probability sF(ˆ r)=1− F(k). With partial
31information the separation probability sP is as follows. Let rP
k =m a x {(1− n
mδ)r, m
n−k(1−δ)r};
with k ≤ n.I fˆ r<(1− n
mδ)r = r, the incumbent separates no matter what k is and sP(ˆ r)=1 .
If rP
k ≤ ˆ r<r P
k+1, the incumbent separates with probability sP(ˆ r)=1 −F(k). Thus separation
probability is decreasing step function with the same downward jump of F(k)−F(k−1) around
rP
k and rF
k . Since for all k ≤ n, rF
k = n
n−k(1 − δ)r> r P
k =m a x {(1 − n
mδ)r, m
n−k(1 − δ)r}
then the step function sF(ˆ r) decreases less rapidly than the step function sP(ˆ r).T h u sg i v e n
that sF(0) = sP(0) = 1 we must have sF(ˆ r) ≥ sP(ˆ r) for all ˆ r, with strict inequality for ˆ r>r .
Hence we conclude that separation probability is higher with full information.
(ii) Given s ﬁxed, the fact that voter welfare is higher with full information follows from
( 5 . 4 )a n dt h ef a c tt h a tEWF(s)=EWD(s).
(iii) Let EWF(s),EW P(s) be voter expected welfares with full and partial information
conditional on a ﬁxed s. Then from (4.4), (5.3) above,




i.e. conditional on a given s, voters prefer full information. So, if δπ >
∆I
∆S, the voters also
prefer a higher separation probability and the result follows immediately.
If δπ <
∆I
∆S, an example where partial information is preferred to full information is the
following. Assume ˆ r is such that (1 − 3
2δ)r ≤ ˆ r<(1 − δ)r. Then, from the formulae (4.1),
(5.1), we see that sF =1 ,s P = q3+3q2(1−q). Then, noting that at a given s, EWD = EWF,
the example is exactly the same as in Example 1 above. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) Assume that a voter in i will re-elect the incumbent even if
he observes gi = gH,τ= τH. If k<m ,only two strategies can possibly be optimal for the
incumbent. The ﬁrst is to take maximum rent in all regions, thus losing the election which gives
him a payoﬀ nr + δ.0. The second is pool with respect to taxation, and pool with respect to
expenditure in m low-cost regions, thus being re-elected. This gives payoﬀ mˆ r+(n−m)τH+δnr.
The second strategy is better iﬀ
mˆ r+(n−m)τH
n ≥ (1 − δ)r.
If k ≥ m, again two strategies can possibly be optimal for the incumbent. The ﬁrst is to
take maximum rent in all regions, thus losing the election which gives him a payoﬀ nr+δ.0. The
second is to pool with respect to expenditure in n−k low-cost regions and m−(n−k) high-cost
regions, and separate with respect to expenditure elsewhere. This gives payoﬀ (n−k)ˆ r +(n−
m)τH + δnr. The second strategy is better iﬀ
(n−k)ˆ r+(n−m)τH
n ≥ (1 − δ)r.
(ii) It remains to verify that a voter in i will re-elect the incumbent even if he observes
gi = gH,τ= τH. But an argument identical to that in the proof of Proposition 1 indicates











































Figure 2: Separation Probabilities, 
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